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The increase in the international price of rice is likely 
to have substantial negative impacts on the poor in 
countries such as Mali which are net importers of rice. 
This paper relies on a dynamic CGE model to estimate 
the likely impact of the recent increase in rice prices on 
poverty with and without policy responses. Two sets 
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of policy responses are considered: import tax cuts on 
rice and measures to increase productivity of domestic 
rice production. The results suggest that an increase in 
productivity would have a much larger positive impact 
than a reduction in taxes.Impact of Rising Rice Prices and Policy Responses in Mali: 
Simulations with a Dynamic CGE Model
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  11. Introduction 
Many countries from the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) have 
been hit hard by the recent increase in food prices.  While the countries have to some extent been 
protected from the full impact of the increase in international cereals prices due to the 
appreciation of the Franc CFA which is pegged to the Euro, they have nevertheless been highly 
vulnerable due to the fact that a substantial part of the consumption of cereals is imported, 
especially in the case of rice.  In Mali, the overall inflation rate for the last twelve months has 
reached more than ten percent, and food prices have increased even more (WAEMU, 2008). 
It is well known that the increase in cereals prices is likely to have substantial negative 
impacts on the poor (for reviews and multi-country work on this, see Ivanic and Martin, 2007; 
International Monetary Fund, 2008; Wodon et al., 2008; Wodon and Zaman, 2008; and World 
Bank, 2008a and 2008b).  However, detailed work at the country level on the likely impacts of 
the crisis is still scarce especially in West African countries were data are often weaker. 
According to field data collected in Mali, the price of rice is today about 25 percent 
higher than it was a year ago (USAID, 2008).  Using recent household survey data, and 
following a well established methodology in order to identify the likely impact of the food price 
crisis on both consumers and producer (on this methodology see among others Deaton (1989), 
Barrett and Dorosh (1996) and Budd (1993)), Joseph and Wodon (2008) find that an increase in 
the price of cereals (rice, millet, sorghum, corn and wheat) of 25 percent would lead to an 
increase in the share of the population in poverty of 1.7 percentage point (this would represents 
close to 300,000 persons falling into poverty).  The increase in the price of rice alone would 
increase the share of the population in poverty by 1.5 percentage point.   
  2However, a limit of standard microeconomic work based on household surveys is that 
estimates of the short term effect of higher food prices through the identification of net producers 
and net consumers do not take into account a wide range of potential effects.  For example, the 
increase in food prices may be partially compensated by an increase in wages for those workers 
who contribute to the production of food crops (see for example Ravallion, 1990; Boyce and 
Ravallion, 1991, Rashid, 2002; Christaensen and Demery 2007; and Ivanic and Martin, 2007).  
While the findings from the literature suggest that wage offsets compensate only in a limited way 
for the initial increase in food prices, this remains an empirical issue that must be resolved 
through detailed work at the country level.  Changes in food prices may also lead to substantial 
changes in production and consumption patterns within a country as households modify their 
consumption patterns, and local producers aim to take advantage of new opportunities. 
In this paper, our objective is to go one step further versus standard household survey 
analysis by relying on a dynamic CGE model in order to assess the broader impact of the shock 
on the economy.   We focus on the impact of the increase in the price of rice, since this is the 
main commodity that is imported in Mali.  In so doing, we follow among others on previous 
work by Warr (2005) and Sumarto et al. (2005) on Indonesia (on the Indonesia story as well as 
for a more general discussion on the experience of governments in Asia to stabilize the price of 
rice, see Timmer and Dawe, 2007), as well as Niimi et al. (2004) and Minot and Goletti (1998) 
on Vietnam.  A key difference between our work and previous work is that we focus on the 
impact of the rice price increase in a country that is a net importer of rice (even though Mali also 
produces a lot of rice), while much of the previous work focused on net rice exporters.  
In CGE work, a key empirical reference is the IFPRI standard model as documented in 
Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002), which is based on the classical work by Dervis, de Melo 
  3and Robinson (1982). In our model for Mali, essential elements of the model’s dynamics are 
drawn form Thurlow (2004), and discussed by Rumpalla, Semega and Vellutini (2006) and 
Nouve, Rumpalla and Vellutini (2007). Our Malian model is solved for eight subsequent periods 
or years, from 2004 to 2012, with the price shocks starting in 2008.  We use a sequential model 
in which static within-period equilibriums are dynamically linked between periods through 
optimal accumulation and allocation of the capital stocks. The growth path has an exogenous 
component, which is derived from available information on expected growth and the expected 
policy environment over the simulation period.  We are interested in assessing the likely extent 
to which the recent food price shock will have an impact on Mali’s economy and household 
poverty by measuring the divergence from the expected growth path induced by the shock.   
We are also interested in assessing to what extent policy responses would help in 
transforming the current crisis into an opportunity for development.  The authorities as well as 
development partners have essentially considered two sets of measures to deal with the crisis.  
The first measure has consisted in the elimination of the import tax on rice in order to help offset 
part of the negative impact on the poor of the increase in international prices.  The second policy 
response is more ambitious, as the government of Mali has announced a “rice initiative” in order 
to boost domestic production by fifty percent by 2009.  Our model enables us to simulate the 
potential impact of both policy responses, and to compare the effectiveness of each type of 
policy not only in the short run, but in the medium term as well. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents our methodology.  Section 3 
describes our data and assumptions, and it also outlines the various scenarios that we consider for 
the empirical work.  Section 4 provides our empirical results.  A brief conclusion follows.  
 
  42.   Methodology 
2.1. Static  equilibrium 
As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis is based on a dynamic CGE model for 
Mali constructed along the lines of the IFPRI standard model (Lofgren, Harris and Robinson, 
2002).  The static equilibrium takes place within a single period, and it is based on competitive 
Walrasian markets for goods and production factors (Decaluwé and Martens, 1988). Key 
hypotheses include: (i) profit maximization by producers under a convex technology; (ii) utility 
maximization by risk-averse consumers; (iii) factor payments at their marginal value products; 
(iv) only relative prices matter, as the model is homogenous of degree zero in prices; (v) market 
equilibrium achieved through instantaneous adjustment in the supply and demand of goods and 
factors. In addition to its neoclassical Walrasian characteristics, the equilibrium incorporates 
structural rigidities on the supply and demand sides. For example, a large part of food production 
is not sold on the market, but rather consumed within the production unit (the household). Such a 
behavior requires that the model explicitly accounts for home consumption, which is done in this 
study with the LES demand system. Thus, the static model is best described as a neoclassical 
structural model. On the supply side, the model accounts for sector-specificity of the capital 
factors. Restricted mobility of capital, although non-neoclassical, is a feature of the Malian 
agrarian economy.  
The static model represents production with a nested technology at two levels. At the 
bottom of the technology nest, intermediate inputs are combined into an aggregate intermediate 
demand using fixed Leontief proportions; at the same level, production factors are combined into 
an aggregate production factor (or value added), assuming an imperfect factor substitutability 
which is represented by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. At the top of the 
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combined into activity output using a Leontief technology. Because Mali is an open economy, 
the produced output has two alternative uses: domestic use or exports. For exported 
commodities, the model allows for an imperfect transformation of output into domestic sales and 
exports, using the Powell-Gruen’s Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) trade function 
(Powell and Gruen, 1968). For non-exported commodities, the totality of the production is 
absorbed on the domestic market. On the demand side, domestic commodity sales are combined 
with imports to form an aggregate demand. Imperfect substitutability between domestic sales and 
imports is assumed using the Armington trade function (Armington, 1969).  
  Mali being a small country, the static model also assumes price-taking behavior on the 
world markets. Thus, the domestic prices of imports and exports are directly linked to exogenous 
world prices after accounting for differences due to exchange rate, taxes, and marketing margins. 
The model is closed with a set of macroeconomic and factor market clearing conditions that are 
extensively described in Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002). All prices are expressed with 
respect to the consumer price index, which is the numéraire. On the factor market, capital supply 
is fixed and sector-specific, implying sector specific rental rates.  The labor supply is fixed and 
the labor market clears through economy-wide wages. The external market is cleared assuming a 
fixed exchange rate, implying that foreign savings are endogenous. The Government current 
account clears through endogenous savings while tax rates are assumed to be exogenous. 
Although private savings are exogenous in the static model, they are flexible (in the tradition of 
Solow) in the dynamic model to which we now turn.  
 
  62.2. Dynamics   
The surge in rice prices has both immediate and longer term impacts on the economy. 
The immediate impact occurs in the first year of the shock, and this is typically what is captured 
through a static CGE model. As noted by Cline (2004) and others, however, dynamic effects of 
shocks may be fairly different from static effects. The dynamic analysis helps capture additional 
impacts of the shock in subsequent periods (or a reduction in impacts when the economy is able 
to adjust), after accounting for the immediate effects. The rise in rice prices is expected to 
increase domestic rice prices in the short run. But as the economy absorbs and adjusts to the 
shock, producers reallocate their resources towards rice production and consumers could update 
their preferences, which would ultimately attenuate the impact of the initial surge in prices. 
Using a multi-period model also helps incorporate exogenous growth hypotheses regarding the 
population and the labor force, total factor productivity, transfers and public spending.  
Thurlow (2004) extensively describes the dynamics of the model that we are using here, 
which is essentially driven by capital accumulation in the spirit of Solow. The law of motion of 
capital starts with endogenous investments within a given period. Investments are financed using 
endogenous savings, which depend on endogenous revenues of agents with a fixed marginal 
propensity to save. Current investments contribute to update the capital stock of the next period, 
after accounting for depreciation of existing capital. In any given period, total investment is 
optimally allocated to various sectors. The allocation rule dictates that sectors with relatively 
larger returns to investment in the current period will receive a relatively larger share of the 
investments in the next period.   
 
  72.3. Poverty 
Estimates of poverty are generally measured using household per capita income or 
consumption derived from nationally representative household surveys. In this paper, we rely on 
Mali’s 2001 poverty evaluation survey or EMEP which covered 7,500 households. Since the 
procedure for measuring the impact of shocks on poverty using the CGE results is discussed in 
Rumpalla, Semega and Vellutini (2006) and Nouve, Rumpalla and Vellutini (2007) we only 
present the most relevant relationships. Household h from group g has a level of per capita 
consumption spending Ehg defined as the product of a price vector p and a consumption bundle 
xhg(p,yhg), where yhg is the household’s disposable income, so that Ehg = p’*xhg(p,yhg). Denoting 
the base scenario by the superscript 0 and a scenario after the food price shock by the superscript 
s, per capita consumption spending after the shock   in terms of the base year price vector is: 
s
hg E
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The term in the bracket is computed from the CGE model for each scenario and each 
year, whereas is derived from the household survey data in the base year. This formulation 
assumes that the food price shock has different impacts across household groups, but the within-
group impact is identical for all households belonging to the group.  Said differently, we 
combine the CGE results and the household surveys to perform micro simulations
0
hg E
2. We use 
standard FGT measures (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) to compute the effects of the food 
price shock on poverty. For a vector of household expenditures E, a poverty line z, a total 
                                                 
2 Alternatives to our approach to fully account for within-group heterogeneity of impacts are twofold. A first 
alternative is to specify a density function for the within-group distribution of consumption and to use this 
distribution to compute individual impacts within each household group. Examples include de Janvry, Sadoulet and 
Fargeix (1991) and Decaluwé et al. (1999) who used the lognormal and beta distribution functions, respectively. A 
second alternative is to include all households in the survey in the CGE model and compute the impact of the shock 
directly from the macro model. Cockburn (2002) is an example of the latter approach. 
  8population N and a population living under the poverty line q, the FGT measures are computed 
as follows:  






















where  α measures the power of the FGT indices. We present results for α = 0 (poverty 
headcount), α = 1 (poverty gap) and α = 2 (squared poverty gap). This is done for the baseline as 
well as each of the scenarios.   
 
3.  Data, calibration and scenarios 
3.1  Data and calibration of the model 
In this section, we present our data sources, including the 2004 social accounting matrix 
on which the CGE model is based, the key parameters used for the static and dynamic calibration 
of the model, and the household survey data used for the poverty analysis.  We focus our 
analysis on the impact of the increase in the price of rice, since this is the main imported food. 
The CGE model is calibrated to a 2004 social accounting matrix (SAM), which includes 
26 production sectors, 28 goods and services, 2 production factors, 11 household groups, 6 tax 
accounts, 2 capital accounts, and the rest of the world account (on the construction of the SAM, 
see Nouve et al., 2005). Rice production is captured in the SAM through two activities: food 
crop production whereby the paddy is produced, and cereal milling whereby the crop is 
transformed into the rice actually sold on markets.  
According to the SAM, as shown in Table 1, the value of local rice production (milling) 
in Mali amounted to CFAF69 billions in 2004 (approximately US$ 140 million), representing 3.1 
percent of the GDP of the year. Nearly 80 percent of the value of rice production comes from the 
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payments of production factors (nearly 21 percent) and taxes (1.4 percent). Although rice milling 
contributes for less than one percent to total GDP (0.6 percent), paddy production represents 
more than one percent of GDP so that overall, the rice sector accounts for more than 2 percent of 
GDP in Mali. 
Additional insights on the Malian rice economy can be derived from the SAM using 
demand analysis. Total demand for rice represents approximately 5 percent of GDP, with a 2004 
nominal value of nearly CFAF108 billions. Considering all forms of demands, more than one 
quarter of total demand (26.1 percent) comes from home consumption whereas the remaining 
three quarters are purchased on the market (table 1). Home consumption is even slightly more 
important if we only consider the demand by households (28.2 percent of total household 
demand for rice in 2004—see Column 2 in table 2). The SAM shows that households represented 
more than 90 percent of the market demand for rice in 2004, which represents more than 3 
percent of GDP (table 1), since this also includes demand satisfied through rice imports which 
account for about 40 percent of total rice consumption. Regarding the value of market supply, it 
can be decomposed into domestic sales by rice producers (50 percent), imports (31 percent), 
marketing costs or margins (16.5 percent) and taxes (2.3 percent). 
Although the SAM includes 11 household groups, which serve as the basis for poverty 
analysis, the presentation will focus on the six groups indicated in table 2. These include four 
urban and two rural household groups: (i) households in which the head live in urban area and 
works in industry; (ii) urban households with a head that is a public servant; (iii) urban 
households with heads working in private services; (iv) urban households with the heads 
  10working in non-industry and non-services sectors; (v) rural households with heads working in 
agriculture; and (vi) rural households with heads working outside agriculture.  
The combined rice demand (from home production as well as imports) from these six 
household groups amounted to more than CFAF100 billion in 2004. Home consumption is 
important for all household groups, representing between 22 percent and 30 percent of total 
household rice consumption (table 2). Even in households where the head works in public or 
private services, own production of rice is important as many non-agricultural workers, 
particularly in secondary towns, own small plots where they grow food and cash crops. Using the 
SAM, it is also possible to appreciate the share of rice in household consumption. Rice budget 
shares vary from less than one percent for households headed by an urban dweller working in 
public services to close to 11 percent for households for which the head derives his/her 
livelihood for rural non-agricultural activities. 
The calibration of our CGE model is based on a SAM for 2004 which relies in part on 
data from the 2001 EMEP survey.  Since then, a new survey has been implemented in Mali (the 
2006 ELIM survey).  Estimates of rice consumption and production from the 2006 ELIM remain 
of the same order of magnitude than the values used for the 2004 SAM.  According to Joseph 
and Wodon (2008) who used the 2006 ELIM to conduct an analysis of the impact on poverty of 
the increase in food prices (but without taking into account general equilibrium effects), more 
than 90 percent of the population consume rice and the average level of spending among those 
who consume rice is 153,000 FCFA per year per household. The household surveys does not 
distinguish between imported and locally produced rice, but a comparison of data on the income 
received from rice production with data on the consumption of rice suggests that the average 
value of consumption is about two times higher than the average income received from rice.  It is 
  11likely that consumers pay a mark up over the producer price of rice (given the need to transport 
and market the locally produced rice), but it is also likely that some of the rice produced in Mali 
is exported to neighboring countries.  Therefore, one can assume that about 40 percent to 50 
percent of the rice consumed in the country is locally produced, which is the common perception 
in the country, and is also what one finds in the SAM data.  The household survey suggests that 
rice is consumed as frequently in rural than in urban areas, although rural consumption of rice 
relies more on auto-consumption.  However, the data also suggests that rice is consumed more 
intensively by urban and comparatively richer households than by the rural poor.  In the top 
quintile of consumption per capita, rice consumption per household is almost five times higher 
than in the bottom quintile.   
It is important to mention that beyond rice, other cereals also matter, but it is the price of 
rice that is likely to have the largest effect on households.  The 2006 ELIM survey data suggest 
that millet and sorghum consumption is at about the same level on average as rice consumption, 
while the consumption of corn and wheat and bread is five times smaller.  As for rice, more than 
nine out of ten households consume millet and sorghum, but the key difference is that most of 
the consumption of millet and sorghum is locally produced, and a very high share of that 
production is auto-consumed. The same is true for corn (by contrast, wheat and bread tend to be 
imported, but these goods are much smaller in terms of their share of total consumption).  Thus, 
because millet and sorghum are essentially auto-consumed, changes in prices for these cereals 
are likely to have a much lower impact on the overall economy and household poverty than 
changes in rice prices. 
In addition to the 2004 SAM, additional data used to calibrate the static model include 
behavioral elasticities for production, demand, and trade. Demand elasticities have been 
  12calibrated from the LES demand using the Frisch parameter and household specific expenditure 
elasticities that have been estimated from household survey data. Rampulla, Semega and 
Vellutini (2006) provide details on each of these parameters, including production and trade 
elasticities. An important parameter for the analysis in this paper is the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic sales and imports of rice. This elasticity has been set to 2 for a first set of 
results, corresponding to an Armington’s function exponent of 0.5. That is, imported rice and 
domestic rice are only partial substitutes, as many Malians prefer the local variety over imports 
(as noted in USAID, 2008).  For sensitivity analysis, we also present a second set of results under 
conditions of lower substitutability, with the Armington function elasticity set at 1.2.  
Regarding the calibration of the dynamic model, emphasis has been put on identifying a 
realistic exogenous growth path of the economy in the medium run. The assumptions are shown 
in table 3. In particular, fiscal efficiency is assumed to improve moderately by 0.5 percent per 
year. As explained by Rampulla, Semega and Vellutini (2006), this reflects recent efforts by the 
Government to increase the tax base. In addition, population is assumed to grow at 2.2 percent, 
and the growth in population contributes to increase aggregate demand via the effects on 
subsistence consumption from the LES demand system. Labor supply is assumed exogenous, 
with a two percent annual growth. Total factor productivity growth was set to 1.5 percent per 
year, based on data from IMF (2006), and capital stock was assumed to depreciate by four 
percent per year. Finally, the grant from the rest of the world to the Government will continue to 
grow by five percent per year, whereas the annual growth of the Government current 
expenditures will stay at four percent.  
 
  133.2 Scenarios 
We consider six different scenarios (table 4).  The base scenario is the business as usual 
scenario. Rice prices, rice taxes, and rice productivity all remain unchanged.  The second 
scenario is based on an increase in the international price of rice of 80 percent between July 2007 
and July 2008.  This is the level of the increase actually observed in FCFA.  The third scenario 
considers an increase in international rice prices of 110 percent, corresponding to the increase in 
US dollar terms.  The difference between the two scenarios stems from the fact that the FCFA is 
pegged to the Euro and has thus appreciated against the US dollar over the same period. Next, 
we consider four other scenarios based on two policy responses from the authorities.  A first 
response consists in eliminating the import taxes on rice.  A second policy response consists in 
implementing interventions to increase the productivity of rice production by 15 percent (this is 
an arbitrary level of productivity gains used for illustrative purposes).  Thus, we first run the 
model assuming that the only response is the import tax cut, and next we add to the import tax 
cut a second response which is meant to increase agricultural productivity. 
Compared to the no intervention scenarios, the tax cut should help reduce the increase in 
rice prices, but its impact may be limited when compared to the magnitude of the shock.  Indeed, 
before the crisis, the total cumulative tax rate on imported rice was at 32.48 percent.  This overall 
tax rate results from the following: an import tax of ten percent according to the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union common external tariff, a tax of one percent levied to support the 
collection of statistical data in the country, another tax of one percent (solidarity levy) to support 
the secretariat of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, a community levy of 0.5 
percent for the ECOWAS (Economic Commission of West African States) secretariat, and 
finally a value added tax of 18 percent (note of these taxes tends to be applied to local rice since 
  14sales of local rice are largely informal).  Thus, while total taxation on imported rice is high, it is 
still well below the actual increase in the international price of imported rice, and to date, only 
the import tax on rice has been temporarily eliminated by the authorities.  It must be noted that in 
the SAM underlying our CGE, rice taxes appear to be smaller than expected since they represent 
only 7.4 percent of imports (while the tax rate is supposed to be at 10 percent).  Because of this 
relatively small fiscal pressure in the SAM, we can anticipate that removing import taxes on rice 
would have only limited impact on consumer prices and more generally the economy as a whole.  
The additional intervention simulated here is that of an increase in productivity.  This 
simulation is provided because the government of Mali has also adopted a 2008-2009 Rice 
Initiative through which land should be set aside and agricultural equipment and inputs should be 
provided to increase the production of paddy by fifty percent to reach 1.6 million tons per year, 
which would provide one million tons of marketable rice (including potentially some production 
that could be exported).  The assumptions for this increase in local rice production include higher 
yields, which require higher productivity.  The total cost of this program was estimated at CFAF 
42.65 billion (more than US$80 million), one fourth of which would be allocated to the purchase 
of seeds and fertilizers. In our simulations, we factor a somewhat smaller increase in rice 
production than the level targeted by the authorities because the government’s plan is very 
ambitious, and we assume that this increase will come from higher productivity and the supply 
response on the part of producers (we do not model here the additional allocations in terms of 
investments to be made by the government of Mali for this expansion of rice production). 
 
  154. Results 
Tables 5 through 8 provide our empirical results on supply, demand and prices (tables 5-
6), and on poverty (tables 7-8).  Table 5 shows that the average price of rice (which covers both 
imported and locally produced rice) increases by 21 percent in 2008 against the base scenario.  
This is a much lower increase than the 80 percent increase in the international price of rice in 
large part because a majority of the rice consumed is produced domestically, and this proportion 
increases when the price of imported rice shoots up.  Given that international and domestically 
produced rice are imperfect substitutes, and that there is anecdotal evidence that Malians find 
imported rice to be of lower quality than domestically produced rice, it is actually not too 
surprising that average rice prices increase by a significantly lower proportion than international 
prices.  The estimated increase in the price of rice is also very much in line with what has been 
observed in the country.  According to the latest brief from USAID Mali (2008), the price of rice 
today is approximately 25 percent higher than it was one year ago.  If Mali had not been partially 
protected from higher rice prices thanks to the appreciation of the Euro and the CFAF versus the 
US dollar, the increase in the average price of rice of the country would have been 26 percent 
according to our model. 
The removal of import tax duties on imported rice does not seem to have a large effect on 
the average price of rice, since depending on the year the reduction in the price increase thanks to 
the tax cuts is only of one to two percentage points.  This is perhaps less than expected, but stems 
again from the fact that imported and domestic rice are imperfect substitutes, and from the fact 
that the removal of taxes is relatively small as compared to the exogenous increase in 
international prices for rice.  The scenarios under which productivity is increased have a larger 
impact on rice prices, with a downward pressure on prices of about seven percent.  
  16Producer prices are increasing substantially less than consumer prices.  There are various 
potential explanations for this.  First, it may be that the margins made by intermediaries are 
larger than they initially were.  Second, the producer price as presented in table 5 is an average 
over total production, including production used for auto-consumption. Third, the model may 
have not fully accounted for on-the-ground capacity constraints to rice production, such as the 
actual availability of additional irrigated land or farm equipment. As a consequence, the outward 
shift in supply that increases production and lowers prices may have been overestimated.  
The model predicts a substantial supply response and a sharp decrease in imported rice to 
the benefit of domestic rice.  Under the scenario corresponding to the 80 percent increase in 
international prices, rice production increases by 24 percent in the first year, and up to 28 percent 
by 2012.  Under the additional measures taken by the authorities, including measures to boost 
productivity, the increase is larger, reaching 32 percent in the first year, and up to 43 percent by 
2012.  These are very large increases in production, but they are still below the announced (and 
very ambitious) objectives of the Government of Mali to increase rice production by 50 percent 
by 2009 through a range of measures to boost productivity in the rice sector.  As production of 
rice increases, imports decrease.  The total demand for rice (imported and domestic) decreases by 
three to seven percentage points depending on the scenarios and years of the simulations.  
One could argue that the above results could be partly driven by our assumption of a 
relatively high degree of substitution between imports and domestic rice production (Armington 
elasticity equals 2 in the simulations presented thus far).  However, it turns out that the results 
are not too sensitive, at least qualitatively, to this assumption.  Under the alternative assumption 
of lower substitution (with an elasticity of 1.2), domestic prices increase faster by 3 percentage 
points; production increases less rapidly by 9 percentage points (so the difference in impacts is 
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these changes, the main conclusions of the analysis remain robust. 
The most important results are those obtained for poverty measures (tables 7-8).  Under 
the first scenario, which corresponds to an increase in the price of rice of 21 percent in the 
country, the headcount index of poverty increases by 0.7 percentage point in the first year versus 
the baseline, and the overall increase after five years is 0.89 point.  Given that Mali’s population 
is at around 12 million people, this means that 107,000 people would fall into poverty.  If Mali 
had not been protected by the appreciation of its currency, so that the international price of rice 
would have increased by 110 percent and the average price in the country by 26 percent, the 
increase in poverty would have reached 0.99 percentage point under scenario (2) by the year 
2012.  These are substantial impacts, although they are lower than that estimates obtained using 
the 2006 ELIM survey by Joseph and Wodon (2008) who find an increase in the headcount index 
of about 1.5 percentage point with a 25 percent increase in the price of rice.  The fact that under 
the CGE model the impact is lower than with the survey-based work was to be expected since 
the CGE model includes a supply response for rice production as well as other adjustments in the 
economy and in the consumption patterns of households, while the survey based work does not. 
The beneficial impact of the import and other tax cuts on rice is fairly limited, with these 
policies generating a gain in poverty reduction of only a tenth of a percentage point for most 
scenarios and simulation years.  By contrast, the impact of an increase in productivity is much 
larger, since as of the year 2009, this increase in productivity is such that poverty is actually 
reduced following the initial price shock.  The largest reduction in poverty observed in 2012 
comes from the combination of the tax cut and the productivity gains.  The findings with the 
poverty gap and squared poverty gap are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the 
  18headcount index, although the impacts are smaller in percentage points since these measures are 
also smaller in magnitude than the headcount.   
In the absence of productivity gains, the impacts are largest for agricultural and informal 
non-agricultural households. But when productivity gains are factored in, these households 
benefit substantially, due to the interactions between the production of paddy rice and other 
sectors of the economy (including in the rice value chain).  Households working in industries and 
public services are by contrast less affected as they tend to be better off and can therefore cope 
with the shock. The headcount index behaves more erratically for urban households working in 
private services, suggesting that a fair number of these households may be located near the 
poverty line (many of these households are active in the informal sector and tend to be poor or 
near poor). The scenarios indeed appear to have a “wave” effect on this group, with poverty 
measures swinging somewhat widely depending of the magnitude of the impact, the policy 
measures taken and the years for the simulations. However, when we move to the higher order 
poverty measures such as the poverty gap and squared poverty gap which are less sensitive to 
movements near the poverty line, the estimates suggest that this group is relatively less 
vulnerable to the rise in rice prices. Also, our estimates of the impact on poverty of various 




  We have provided in this paper a general equilibrium analysis of the potential impact on 
poverty in Mali of the recent increase in the international price of rice.  Our simulations suggest 
that the average price of rice in the country should have increased by about 20 percent to 25 
  19percent, which is indeed what has been observed in the country over the last year.  Without 
policy responses, the share of the population in poverty would increase by 0.7 percentage point, 
and the increase would have been even larger if the FCFA had not been appreciating versus the 
US dollars.  While a reduction in indirect taxes on rice would have only a limited effect on 
prices, production, and poverty, an increase in the productivity of the rice sector could have 
major effects, and could lead in the medium term to a reduction in poverty rather than an 
increase.  This suggests that the emphasis placed by the government of Mali on boosting rice 
production through various measures in the recently announced “rice initiative” is appropriate.   
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  23Table 1: Structure of rice supply and demand in Mali, 2004 SAM 
Items Values  and  shares 
Item as a percentage 
of GDP 
 
Total production (in billions CFA francs)  69.0  3.1% 
   Share of intermediate demand in total production  77.6%  2.4% 
   Share of value added in total production  20.9%  0.6% 
   Share of production taxes in total production  1.4%  0.0% 
    
Total demand (in billions CFA francs)  107.9  4.8% 
Components of total demand    
   Share of home consumption in total demand  26.1%  1.3% 
   Share of market demand in total demand  73.9%  3.6% 
Components of market demand    
   Share of households’ demand in market demand  90.6%  3.2% 
   Share of other uses in total demand  9.4%  0.3% 
Components of market supply    
   Share of imports in market demand  31.3%  1.1% 
   Share of domestic sales in market demand  49.9%  1.8% 
   Share of taxes in market  demand  2.3%  0.1% 
   Share of marketing margins in market demand  16.5%  0.6% 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2004 SAM. 
 




























rice in total 
expendi-
ture (%) 
Urban industry  0.207  0.730  0.936  74.509  22.1%  1.3% 
Urban public services  0.451  1.041  1.493  176.206  30.2%  0.8% 
Urban private services  0.920  2.105  3.025  296.775  30.4%  1.0% 
Other urban activities  0.401  1.012  1.413  84.544  28.4%  1.7% 
Agriculture  13.249 36.899 50.148  573.924 26.4%  8.7% 
Other rural activities  12.978  30.460  43.437  402.087  29.9%  10.8% 
Total 28.206  72.247  100.453  1,608.046  28.1%  6.2% 
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the 2004 SAM. 
 
Tableau 3: Assumptions for the dynamic CGE model 
Variables   Exogeneous baseline  
annual growth rates 
Labor force   2,0 % 
Total factor productivity*  1,5 % 
Population   2,2 % 
Public consumption   4,0 % 
Fiscal efficiency   0,5 % 
Government’s transfers to domestic institutions  4,0% 
Rest of the world’s transfers to Government   5,0 % 
Capital depreciation rate   4,0 % 
Source: Based on Rampulla, Semega and Vellutini (2006) and FMI (2006). 
 
  24Table 4: Scenarios of rice price changes and policy responses 
Scenario Scenario  Description  Percentage   
change in rice 
prices 
Percentage  
reduction in  
rice taxes 
Percentage 
 change in  
productivity 
Base  Base scenario (business as usual)  0%  0%  0% 
(1)   Rice price shock in CFAF (+80%)  +80%  0%  0% 
(2)  Rice price shock in USD (+110%)  +110%  0%  0% 
(3)  Scenario (1) with 100% tax cut on rice  +80%  -100%  0% 
(4)  Scenario (2) with 100% tax cut on rice  +110%  -100%  0% 
(5)  Scenario (3) with 15% rice productivity gain  +80%  -100%  +15% 
(6)  Scenario (4) with 15% rice productivity gain  +110%  -100%  +15% 
Source: Authors. 
 
Table 5: Impact of scenarios on rice production, consumption and prices (Armington 
elasticity for rice = 2.0) 
Scenarios  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  Consumption prices for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.21 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.15 
(2)  1.00 1.26 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.19 
(3)  1.00 1.20 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.14 
(4)  1.00 1.25 1.20 1.18 1.18 1.17 
(5)  1.00 1.20 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
(6)  1.00 1.25 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.12 
  Producer prices for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.06 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.99 
(2)  1.00 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.99 
(3)  1.00 1.04 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98 
(4)  1.00 1.05 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.97 
(5)  1.00 1.04 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 
(6)  1.00 1.05 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 
  Domestic Production of rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.24 1.27 1.28 1.28 1.28 
(2)  1.00 1.30 1.33 1.35 1.35 1.35 
(3)  1.00 1.25 1.28 1.29 1.30 1.30 
(4)  1.00 1.32 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.37 
(5)  1.00 1.25 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 
(6)  1.00 1.32 1.42 1.43 1.43 1.43 
  Imports of rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 
(2)  1.00 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 
(3)  1.00 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.41 
(4)  1.00 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 
(5)  1.00 0.45 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 
(6)  1.00 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
  Total demand for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(2)  1.00 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
(3)  1.00 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 
(4)  1.00 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(5)  1.00 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
(6)  1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Source: Authors. 
 
  25Table 6: Impact of scenarios on rice production, consumption and prices (Armington 
elasticity for rice = 1.2) 
Scenarios  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  Consumption prices for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.24 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.18 
(2)  1.00 1.31 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.24 
(3)  1.00 1.23 1.18 1.17 1.17 1.17 
(4)  1.00 1.30 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22 
(5)  1.00 1.23 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.13 
(6)  1.00 1.30 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.18 
  Producer prices for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.06 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 
(2)  1.00 1.08 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
(3)  1.00 1.04 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
(4)  1.00 1.06 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 
(5)  1.00 1.04 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.89 
(6)  1.00 1.06 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 
  Domestic Production of rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 1.15 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 
(2)  1.00 1.19 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.24 
(3)  1.00 1.15 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 
(4)  1.00 1.20 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
(5)  1.00 1.15 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.24 
(6)  1.00 1.20 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.30 
  Imports of rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
(2)  1.00 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 
(3)  1.00 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
(4)  1.00 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
(5)  1.00 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 
(6)  1.00 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 
  Total demand for rice (index vs. baseline of 1.00) 
(1)   1.00 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(2)  1.00 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
(3)  1.00 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
(4)  1.00 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
(5)  1.00 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
(6)  1.00 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Source: Authors. 
 
  26Table 7: Impact of scenarios on poverty (percentage point difference in poverty measure 
versus baseline projection; Armington elasticity = 2.0) 
Headcount index  Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap
Scenarios  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
  National
(1)  0.70 0.77 1.14 0.87 0.89 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55
(2)  0.75 0.88 1.44 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.74 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67 
(3)  0.67 0.78 1.14 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 
(4)  0.75 0.85 1.37 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.72 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 
(5)  0.67 -0.31 -0.14 -0.29 -0.42 0.76 -0.15 -0.23 -0.26 -0.27 0.58 -0.08 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15
(6)  0.75 -0.11 -0.02 -0.13 -0.22 0.94 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 0.72 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
  Urban industrial
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
(3)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
(4)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 
(5)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 -0.19 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 0.12 -0.10  -0.11  -0.12 -0.11
(6)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 0.15 -0.07  -0.09  -0.09 -0.09
  Urban public services
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(3)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(4)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(5)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01
(6)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01
  Urban private services
(1)  0.28 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(2)  1.13 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 
(3)  0.28 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
(4)  1.13 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
(5)  0.28 -2.42 0.00 -2.11 -0.88 0.20 -0.12 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(6)  1.13 -0.87 0.00 -0.50 -0.76 0.25 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
  Other urban activities (informal)
(1)  0.89 0.60 1.84 1.19 0.63 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(2)  0.92 0.60 1.94 1.66 0.76 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
(3)  0.89 0.60 1.84 1.19 0.63 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
(4)  0.92 0.60 1.94 1.66 0.76 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
(5)  0.89 -1.57 -0.85 -0.36 -1.06 0.32 -0.31 -0.34 -0.36 -0.37 0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
(6)  0.92 -1.46 -0.78 -0.36 -0.99 0.40 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 0.18 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
  Agricultural
(1)  0.98 0.97 1.22 1.18 0.97 1.05 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.78
(2)  0.98 1.14 1.48 1.49 1.07 1.30 1.22 1.20 1.21 1.23 1.04 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.95 
(3)  0.89 0.91 1.22 1.09 0.97 1.02 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.74 
(4)  0.98 1.04 1.40 1.31 1.07 1.27 1.17 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.02 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.91 
(5)  0.89 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.51 1.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 0.82 0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10
(6)  0.98 0.26 0.05 0.19 -0.07 1.27 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.06 1.02 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.06 
  Other rural activities
(1)  0.57 0.91 0.91 0.75 0.84 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.71 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64
(2)  0.58 0.93 1.40 0.76 0.90 1.12 1.06 1.03 1.03 1.04 0.87 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 
(3)  0.57 0.91 0.91 0.75 0.59 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.60 
(4)  0.58 0.93 1.29 0.76 0.89 1.09 1.02 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.74 
(5)  0.57  0.00 -0.10 -0.35 -0.16 0.88 -0.27 -0.37 -0.39 -0.39 0.68 -0.17 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25
(6)  0.58  0.01  0.12 -0.35 -0.09 1.09 -0.09 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 0.84 -0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12
Source: Authors 
  27Table 8: Impact of scenarios on poverty (percentage point difference in poverty measure 
versus baseline projection; Armington elasticity = 1.2) 
Headcount index  Poverty Gap Squared Poverty Gap
Scenarios  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
  National
(1)  0.64 0.72 1.09 0.66 0.90 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56
(2)  0.71 0.84 1.45 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.75 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 
(3)  0.61 0.72 1.06 0.65 0.88 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.54 
(4)  0.71 0.87 1.44 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 
(5)  0.61 -0.39 -0.07 -0.35 -0.47 0.74 -0.16 -0.21 -0.22 -0.22 0.57 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11
(6)  0.71 -0.19 -0.01 -0.17 -0.18 0.95 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.73 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  Urban industrial
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
(3)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
(4)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
(5)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 -0.22 -0.26 -0.27 -0.28 0.09 -0.11  -0.12  -0.12 -0.12
(6)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 -0.16 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 0.12 -0.08  -0.10  -0.10 -0.09
  Urban public services
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(3)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(4)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(5)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01
(6)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 -0.01
  Urban private services
(1)  0.28 0.00 0.87 0.00 2.96 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
(2)  0.28 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
(3)  0.28 0.00 0.87 0.00 2.96 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
(4)  0.28 0.00 2.42 0.00 2.96 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
(5)  0.28 -2.42 -0.50 -2.96 -0.88 0.14 -0.15 -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
(6)  0.28 -2.42 0.00 -2.11 -0.88 0.18 -0.10 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
  Other urban activities (informal)
(1)  0.78 0.64 1.53 0.76 0.70 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
(2)  0.89 0.64 1.84 1.30 0.81 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 
(3)  0.78 0.64 1.53 0.76 0.70 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
(4)  0.89 0.64 1.84 1.30 0.81 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 
(5)  0.78 -1.85 -0.91 -0.47 -0.99 0.24 -0.33 -0.37 -0.39 -0.39 0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
(6)  0.89 -1.42 -0.78 -0.36 -0.95 0.31 -0.25 -0.30 -0.31 -0.31 0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
  Agricultural
(1)  0.70 0.85 1.39 0.90 0.93 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.75
(2)  0.80 1.03 1.67 1.23 1.00 1.27 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.24 1.01 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.96 
(3)  0.66 0.85 1.34 0.90 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 
(4)  0.80 1.03 1.65 1.22 0.99 1.25 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.20 0.99 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.92 
(5)  0.66 -0.20 0.06 -0.05 -0.34 0.97 -0.14 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 0.77 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
(6)  0.80 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.08 1.25 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.99 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.09 
  Other rural activities
(1)  0.57 0.91 1.00 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.71 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66
(2)  0.58 0.93 1.37 0.76 0.90 1.16 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.11 0.91 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 
(3)  0.57 0.91 0.91 0.75 0.84 0.88 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 
(4)  0.58 0.93 1.34 0.76 0.90 1.13 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.07 0.89 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.81 
(5)  0.57  0.00  0.09 -0.35 -0.16 0.88 -0.29 -0.35 -0.35 -0.34 0.69 -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20
(6)  0.58 0.01 0.12 -0.22 -0.09 1.13 -0.06 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 0.89 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
Source: Authors.  
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